

GEW-Tagung 2006 in Magdeburg

Book of Abstracts

Wulf Albers:

Elemente einer neuen verhaltensbasierten Entscheidungstheorie

Otwin Becker:

Ein Beitrag zur Erklärung individueller Vorhersagen von Zeitreihen

1. Experiment wozu?

Das menschliche Gehirn besitzt bekanntlich einen eminent großen Gedächtnispeicher für bildhafte Informationen. In welchen Gehirnregionen auch immer lokalisiert und auf welche Weise gespeichert sind Bilder und Symbole oftmals auch noch langfristig abrufbar. Beim Abgleich von Personen beispielsweise sind sogar Karikaturen derselben noch erkennbar, wenn nur eine geringe Ähnlichkeit zwischen Urbild und Abbild besteht. Dagegen sind Abbildungen von Zeitreihen, wenn sie keine besondere Bedeutung für den Betrachter haben, im Regelfall nicht detailgetreu gespeichert und auch nicht für spätere Vergleichszwecke verfügbar. Eine besondere Rolle, nicht nur im Wirtschaftsleben, spielen Zeitreihen mit unbekanntem Bildungsgesetz und zusätzlichen Überlagerungen durch stochastische Komponenten. Wenn nun auch noch unbekannt ist, was der Graph einer Zeitreihe eigentlich repräsentiert, dann bleibt nurmehr dessen Gestalt als Wissensbasis für eine Prognose der Reihe übrig. Im Jahre 1961 haben Reinhard Selten und ich ausgiebig darüber diskutiert, wie Versuchspersonen nach dem Einfachheitsprinzip, das ja auch in der Gestaltpsychologie eine bedeutende Rolle spielt, derartige Prognoseaufgaben lösen würden. Wir beschlossen, diese Frage - auf eigene Initiative hin - experimentell anzugehen. In den Jahren 1961/62 wurden hierzu zwei Zeitreihen, die eine (PAINT) über 30 Perioden die andere (HISTO) über 42 Perioden als Vorlage genommen und schrittweise den Vps in graphischer Form vorgestellt. Die Versuchspersonen hatten jeweils den Wert der Reihe für die nächste Periode vorauszusagen. Den wahren Wert dieser Periode mußten sie dann in das ihnen vorliegende Kurvenblatt einzeichnen. An dieser Grundversion haben bei PAINT bislang 89 Vps und bei HISTO 295 Vps teilgenommen. Diese Experimente sind später durch Hinzufügen von Leitreihen (lead=1Periode) auf vielfältige Weise erweitert worden.

2. Durchschnittliche Vorhersagen

Die folgende Erklärungsgleichung (B&L-Heuristik) zeigt eine gute Übereinstimmung mit den mittleren Prognosewerten der Versuchspersonen $f(t+1) = x(t) + \text{medslope} (1 - 2P_{\text{umpk}}) \cdot [\text{sgn}(x(t) - x(t-1))] + e(t)$
 $x(t)$ = Basisreihe, medslope = mittlere absol. Veränderung, P_{umpk} = die aus den bisherigen peaks/troughs ausgeählte Schätzung der Umkehrwahrscheinlichkeit; $e(t)$ = Erklärungsfehler. Bei beiden Experimenten lassen sich aus den Häufigkeitsverteilungen der Vorhersagen, in fast allen Perioden mehrere (lokale) Modalwerte bestimmen (oftmals mehr als zwei dichteste Werte). Bei einer multimodalen Verteilung ist das arithmetische Mittel freilich keine befriedigende Erklärung des Individualverhaltens.

3. Individualprognosen

Ein intensives Studium der Häufigkeitsverteilungen ist unumgänglich, wenn es darum geht, nach möglichen Begründungen für die individuellen Vorhersagen zu suchen. Dies gelingt zumeist für die Modalwerte, die häufig als mustergetreue Gestaltsergänzungen zu verstehen sind. Dominantes Ziel der Vps ist zweifelsohne der Versuch, durch Gestaltsergänzung der bisher beobachteten Kurve einen Treffer zu erzielen, während andere Kriterien (z.B. auf Fehlerminimierung zu achten) weniger augenscheinlich sind. Eine Veränderung von ± 0 wurde selbst in Perioden mit großer Richtungsunsicherheit selten prognostiziert. Der nächste Arbeitsschritt besteht anschließend darin, eine Reihe von gestaltsbezogenen Schemata zu definieren, die zur Erklärung der Prognosen herangezogen werden konnten. Typische Schemata bestehen (lokal gesehen) aus linearen Kurvengestalten und (global gesehen) aus Filtern mit Rücksicht auf bisherige Wendepunkte der Reihe, denen eine besondere gestaltgebende Bedeutung zukommt.

Anschließend muß ein Gesamtsystem der Schemata gebildet werden, das zumindest alle Häufungspunkte abdecken sollte. Eine stufenweise Prozedur ist erforderlich, um die endgültig im Gesamtsystem enthaltenen Schemata zu bestimmen. Mit diesem Gesamtsystem ist jede Versuchsperson abzugleichen.

Einige Ergebnisse:

- Vorhersagewerte, die durch mehr als ein Schema erklärt werden können, werden häufiger gewählt als andere

- Mit 1-2 Schemata sind nur wenige Kandidaten hinreichend gut (mtl. Abweichung ≤ 1) erklärbar.
- Die besten Vps (mit vergleichsweise geringen Prognosefehlern) sind bereits durch wenige Schemata über den gesamten Prognosezeitraum erklärbar.
- Das 'beste aus 3' Kriterium erklärt die meisten Vps mit einer Abweichung unter 1 Einheit (HISTO)
- gute/schlechte Vps zeigen vergleichsweise große/geringe Typizität bei den Prognosen.
- Die häufig und besonders in der Anfangsphase zu beobachtende Rundung der Vorhersagewerte auf glatte Zahlen (vor allem bei PAINT) läßt sich hauptsächlich durch die Prominenztheorie erklären, kann aber zum Teil auch auf einen als gering erwarteten Prognoseerfolg zurückgeführt werden.

Nadine Chlaß, Werner Güth, and Christoph Vanberg:
Social Learning of Efficiency Enhancing Trade (With)Out Market Entry Costs

The experimental scenario is the situation of (no) bilateral trade with linearly related values of one buyer and one privately informed seller. To study the evolution of efficiency enhancing trade, participants do not only receive information feedback on their own outcome but also on the average results for all 16 pairs in a session. Market entry costs are first exogenously imposed before letting participants decide whether or not to enter the market. Our conjecture that (voluntarily accepted) market entry costs inspire (even more) trade is only partly confirmed.

Lisa V. Cwojdzinski:
Group Reputation in Experimental Studies - The Bertrand Paradox revisited

Experimental studies in economics are usually performed either in classroom or in a computer laboratory. This paper demonstrates that the way an experiment is conducted can significantly influence the results obtained. Considering a simple price setting duopoly, introduced by Dufwenberg and Gneezy (2000), three different treatments of the ten period game with random re-matching are compared. In the baseline treatment all participants receive information about the bids of all participants as well as the pairings and which were the winning bids after every round. This treatment is played once in a classroom setting (identical to the original experiment) and once in a computer lab to isolate the effect of visual neighbourhood. In another computerised treatment, the participants are only informed about the decisions that are relevant for their own profit, i.e. their own bid and that of their opponent as well as their payoff. It can be shown that participants behave constantly cooperative if they sit in a classroom but that their behavior converges to non-cooperativeness if the same experiment is more anonymously conducted via computers. The amount of information about other participants' choices, however, does per se not have an observable impact.

Gerlinde Fellner and Erik Theissen:
Short sale constraints, divergence of opinion and asset values - Evidence from the laboratory

The overvaluation hypothesis (Miller 1977) predicts that (i) stocks are overvalued when there are short selling restrictions and that (ii) the overvaluation is increasing in the degree of divergence of opinion. We design an experiment that allows us to test these predictions in the laboratory. Our results support the hypothesis that prices are higher in the presence of short selling constraints. The overvaluation does not depend on the degree of divergence of opinion.

Sven Fischer and M. Vittoria Levati:
Does (Mean) Conditional Cooperation Prevail under Perfect Information?

In a simple public good game Fischbacher et al. (2001) elicit contribution schedules and are able to divide subjects into three main types: Conditional cooperators, free riders and hump shaped contributors. Leaning on Fischbacher et al. (2001) we experimentally investigate whether these contribution schedules survive when subjects are able to condition their contributions on more information than only average (or total) contribution(s). Furthermore, by running a restart we test whether elicited schedules are subject specific and independent of experience. We find that while the frequency of observed schedules is mostly invariant with respect to the information given, schedules change after the restart.

Anita Gantner:
Bargaining or Searching for a Better Price? - An Experimental Study

This paper reports an experimental investigation of a bargaining situation that is interlaced with a sequential search process. A buyer and a seller, which both have incomplete information about the

opponent's valuation for the good, can either trade a good or the buyer can choose to buy via search, during which he can choose to return to bargaining at any time. We are interested in the allocation of the surplus, the length of bargaining, and the decision when to start and for how long to continue search. We find that a substantial proportion of buyers choose to trade with the seller when search is predicted to be optimal, and this proportion increases with the surplus the buyer can get from bargaining. For subjects who choose to opt out, search behavior is very efficient and surprisingly close to the optimal search policy.

Tim Grebe, Radosveta Ivanova-Stenzel, and Sabine Kröger:
Getting eBay in the Lab to Test the Role of the „Buy-It-Now“ Feature in Internet Auctions

We study the bidding behavior in auctions with a Buy-It-Now feature, where early potential bidders have the opportunity to accept a take-it-or-leave-it price offer from the seller before the auction starts. Bringing the field into the lab, we invited eBay buyers and sellers into the lab to participate in auctions on the eBay platform. In the experiment, 35% of all sales take place in the Buy-It-Now (negotiation) phase. This contradicts a theoretical model predicting that all sales should take place in the auction rendering the negotiation phase obsolete. As first explanation we investigate whether risk preferences can account for the observed deviation from the theoretical model. Following Holt and Laury, 2002, we elicited individual risk preferences via lottery choices after the auction experiment. We investigate further, to which extent trader's experience with online auctions relates to the deviation from the model predictions. We compare our results to those of a laboratory study, in which all the model's assumptions concerning the selling mechanism were satisfied and explore whether subjects behave differently in eBay auctions than in standard experimental auctions. We also explore whether behavior typically observed in real life online auctions (e.g. "sniping") also occurs in our experimental eBay auctions.

Ben Greiner, Axel Ockenfels, and Peter Werner:
The effects of unequal payment on real effort quantity and quality

We study the effects of unequal payment on quality and quantity of work in a real effort experiment. In each treatment participants first work for the same salary in a first run, and then receive different salaries in the second run. The real effort task is to transfer numbers from printed forms to a computer mask. Our two-by-two design varies whether the salary is fixed or dependent on work quantity (but not quality), and whether participants know the salary of other participants or not.

Veronika Grimm and Friederike Mengel:
Group Selection with Imperfect Separation: Does Cooperation Survive?

A possible explanation for the survival of pro-sociality in social dilemma situations relies on variations in the matching technology. In particular, if agents with a higher inclination to cooperate are matched with increased probability among themselves, cooperation can survive. The intuition simply is that if cooperators interact relatively often with other cooperators they will receive the high payoff for joint cooperation a lot of times, whereas defectors will get the low payoff for joint defection a lot of times. This increases the evolutionary fitness of the cooperators and will thus lead to a proliferation of cooperation. Several recent experimental studies focus on the heterogeneity of social preferences, e.g. Fehr and Gächter (2002), or Fischbacher, Gächter, and Fehr (2001). A recurrent pattern in those studies is that there are different types of players, the two most important being conditional cooperators and egoists (agents who rationally maximize their own monetary payoff). This apparent heterogeneity of preference types raises the question of matching structures. What happens if there is a tendency in a society for agents of a type to interact mainly among each other? Only very recently experimental economics has started to focus on the relation between interaction structures and cooperation. While the cases of perfect separation and random matching have already been studied in the literature (e.g. Bohnet and Kübler (2005), Coricelli et al. (2004)), this is the first study of group selection under imperfect separation. We experimentally investigate the effect of the matching technology on group selection and cooperation in a standard prisoner's dilemma environment. Subjects can repeatedly choose between two groups, where in one of them a pro-social norm fosters cooperation. Under imperfect separation theory predicts that cooperation (and choice of the pro-social group) should persist under high population viscosity (i.e. it is relatively more likely that agents interact with agents of their own type), and defection should prevail under low viscosity.

Markus Groth:

Preisbildung und Bieterverhalten in einer simultanen Mehrgüterausschreibung von Umweltleistungen

Die nationale und europäische Agrarumweltpolitik sieht sich aus ökonomischer Sicht einer zunehmenden Kritik gegenüber, welche maßgeblich in der Honorierung von Umweltleistungen durch Einheitsprämien ohne Berücksichtigung individueller Produktionsbedingungen und Kostenstrukturen der landwirtschaftlichen Betriebe begründet ist. Zur Weiterentwicklung der Agrarumweltpolitik und der Abkehr von einem staatlich gesetzten Einheitspreis wird daher zunehmend der Einsatz von Ausschreibungen als ein Spezialfall eines Auktionsverfahrens diskutiert. Ausschreibungen haben bislang in verschiedensten Bereichen und Ausgestaltungen einen praktischen Einsatz gefunden und ihre Funktion als Allokationsmechanismus wurde umfassend modelliert, dokumentiert und bewertet. Der praktische Einsatz von Ausschreibungen zur Honorierung von Umweltleistung stellt jedoch ein noch relativ junges Anwendungsfeld dar, welches durch grundlegende empirischen Forschungsbedarf gekennzeichnet ist. Der geplante Vortrag gibt einen Überblick über die Konzeption und Ergebnisse einer in diesem Kontext erstmalig in einer Modellregion (dem Landkreis Northeim in Südniedersachsen) durchgeführten simultanen Mehrgüterausschreibung mit preisdiskriminierender Zuschlagserteilung. Darüber hinaus werden ausgewählte Ergebnisse von zwei parallel zum Ausschreibungsverfahren durchgeführten Befragungen diskutiert. Die Angebotspreise der im Zeitraum 2004/2005 durchgeführten ersten Ausschreibungsrunde zeigen, dass es bei allen drei Qualitätsstufen der ausgeschriebenen Umweltleistungen zu den theoretisch erwarteten differenzierten Angebotspreisen und mit einem höheren ökologischen Nutzen auch zu einem höheren Preisniveau gekommen ist. Daraus kann gefolgert werden, dass sich die Landwirte tatsächlich mit individuell verschiedenen Kostenstrukturen und Produktionsbedingungen konfrontiert gesehen haben und im Zuge dessen das hohe praktische Potential für einen effizienteren Einsatz knapper finanzieller Mittel durch Ausschreibungen im Vergleich zu einer einheitlichen Prämie aufgezeigt werden. Den Vortrag abschließend werden erstmals aktuelle Ergebnisse der bis zum April 2006 laufenden zweiten Ausschreibungsrunde in der Modellregion präsentiert, auf deren Grundlage weiterer Forschungsbedarf hinsichtlich der praktischen Erprobung von Ausschreibung zur Honorierung von Umweltleistungen thematisiert werden kann. Hier stehen Fragen der Entwicklung der Angebotspreise und des Bieterverhaltens von Landwirten unter Berücksichtigung der Verarbeitung sich verändernder Informationen und möglicher Preisabsprachen im Mittelpunkt.

Tim Hoppe:

Parallele multiple Auktionen – Eine experimentelle Betrachtung

Claudia Keser and Giuseppe A. Paleologo:

Experimental Investigation of Supplier-Retailer Contracts: The Wholesale Price Contract

We examine decision making in a simple supplier-retailer wholesale price contract in the experimental economics laboratory. We observe wholesale prices and order quantities below the game-theoretical predictions. The supply chain's efficiency is as predicted but profits are more equitably allocated. Keywords: Supply chain coordination, industrial organization, experimental economics.

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Thomas Lauer:

Not just hot air: Normative codes of conduct induce cooperative behaviour

The shirking-incentives arising within team-production are usually counteracted by monitoring and sanctioning. However, these mechanisms are not applicable in all parts of the production-process and if so they induce high monitoring costs. In a laboratory experiment we analyse the impact of less costly elements of organizational structure (normative codes of conduct and screening tests) on the efficiency of team-production. We find that stronger allusions to a firm context lead to higher contributions. Especially the codes of conduct significantly increase the cooperation and at the same time reduce free-riding behavior. Our study provides qualitative evidence that normative codes of conduct are a mean to increase the efficiency of team production.

Gerlinde Fellner, Werner Güth, and Ev Martin:

Task Transcending Satisficing - An Experimental Study

The paper explores the applicability of bounded rationality theory. In particular, we investigate whether basic principles of aspiration formation and satisficing behavior are transferable between

similar situations. Individuals are sequentially confronted with two risky investment tasks, a simple and a more complex one. Initially elicited state-contingent aspirations can be used to predict actual portfolio selection in both tasks. We explore whether individual characteristics of satisficing apply to both scenarios. Results indicate that aspirations are frequently stated such that they cannot be fulfilled. However, aspiration formation itself is highly transferable between tasks.

Astrid Matthey:

Getting Used to Expectations

People get used to their expectations just as they get used to their income or consumption level. This affects their utility and economic decision making. I formalize this idea in a model where people form reference states with respect to their expectations. This allows me to explain observed preferences regarding future outcomes that cannot be explained with existing models. The model yields novel predictions for the behavior of people towards risks, and implications for the regulation of health and environmental risks as well as for the welfare effects of information provision. Data on new infections with HIV in Germany supports the relevance of the results.

Dorothea Alewell and Andreas Nicklisch:

Wage Differentials, Fairness, and Social Comparison

Recent experimental literature in labor economics shows that fairness concerns make a substantial difference for working decisions. Our study systematically explores how the existence of multiple fairness foci influences wage setting and acceptance thresholds. Particularly, we focus on the effect of horizontal fairness concerns, i.e., the wage comparison among employees. For our experiment, we use an institutional design of wage negotiations among employers, employees and temporary agency workers. Working agencies hire these workers and rent them out to firms. Thereby, we create a heterogeneous background of the labour force. Although temporary agency workers do the same work, typically, they receive lower wages due to the intermediate agency. The results of our laboratory experiments indicate that the availability of information concerning co-employee's wage offers strongly influences the wage set and participants' acceptance of contracts. Whereas the relation of average wages is not influenced by the order of the decisions, the absolute level of wages is dependent on the decisions. We find that temporary agency workers who decide on a wage offer after permanent employees receive a premium in addition to their wages, while permanent employees take a cut in wages if they get their wage offer after temporary workers have decided on their offers. These results are more influenced by self-regarding social comparison preferences than by other-regarding horizontal fairness concerns.

Jean-Robert Tyran, Rupert Sausgruber, and Julian Rauchdobler:

Does a Threshold Serve as Mechanism to Increase Efficiency in the Provision of Public Goods?

In a public good environment the inefficiency of such a social dilemma game could be resolved by the (endogenous) implementation of a provision point. The existence of a provision point transfers the dilemma game into a coordination game with a set of efficient equilibria. In our one shot laboratory experiment we find that, despite a significant increase of contribution, efficiency cannot be increased compared to a linear public good. This result holds both under an exogenous and an endogenous implementation of a provision point and is robust to changes in the magnitude of the provision point and changes in the refund rate.

Bodo Vogt, Rainer Schmidt, Klemens Böhm, and Stephan Schosser:

Experimental Analyses of Peer-to-Peer Data Structures

Structured peer-to-peer systems allow to administer large volumes of data. Several peers collaborate to generate a query result. Analyses of unstructured peer-to-peer systems, namely of those for file-sharing, show that peers tend to shirk collaboration. We anticipate similar behavior in structured peer-to-peer systems. Recently, protocols to counter uncooperative behavior in such systems have been proposed. This article examines the behavior of peers under such protocols, using game theory. A first result of this paper is a set of hypotheses, e.g.: Peers answer queries if more than a certain percentage of their queries is answered. In many situations, free-riding does not lead to a break-down of the system. Trust, reciprocity and reputation building via a feedback mechanism are behavioral motives that increase cooperation. As a second step, we have conducted economic experiments with human participants to validate our predictions. Such experiments are important because we do not

need to make any assumptions regarding the behavior of peers. It turns out that the predictions remain valid in these experiments.

Carsten Schmidt:

Disclosing Conflict of Interest – Does Experience and Reputation Matter?

Disclosure of conflict of interest is currently seen as an effective tool for reducing threats to auditor independence. Cain, Loewenstein, and Moore (2005) provide evidence for perverse effects of disclosing conflict of interest. Using a controlled laboratory experiment, we replicate their finding that such a disclosure can cause an impairment of auditor independence. However, as subjects gain experience we find that these results revert and auditors give less biased advice. Our results imply that the perverse effects noted in the literature might be an artifact of an environment with inexperienced subjects and of less relevance for the audit environment where main actors are experienced. To the contrary, disclosure of conflict of interest can even improve auditor independence by fostering fairness. Furthermore, we find that disclosure of conflict of interests disturbs reputation building.

Sebastian Kube and Simone Schneider:

Friendship in a Principal-Multiagent Experiment

Daniel Houser, Daniel Schunk, Joachim Winter, and Erte Xiao:

Temptation and Self-Control

People are very heterogeneous in the extent to which they exercise self-control when facing temptations. Understanding this heterogeneity better is of interest for researchers that study intertemporal decision-making: For example, numerous researchers in the economics as well as the psychological strand of the literature on life-cycle saving and retirement provision decisions acknowledge that individual differences in the ability to self-control (individual differences in “preferences for self-commitment” [Gul & Pesendorfer, 2001]) may help to explain observed decision behavior. At the same time, it is recognized that there is only very little empirical data to inform the theory on temptation and self-control.

This paper is a first attempt to link the psychology literature on temptation and self-control with the corresponding theoretical economic literature on dynamic choice based on a specifically designed laboratory experiment that includes a good that is tempting in a formal sense. More specifically, we are interested in the effect of commitment costs on individual decisions to consume tempting goods, and we connect the observed behavior and its temporal pattern to psychometrically measurable individual traits. While we find that commitment is price sensitive, i.e. related to the cost of commitment, the results indicate that the likelihood of succumbing to temptation is not related to commitment cost. Both findings are in line with theory. Furthermore, our findings suggest that an established psychometric survey instrument that measures stable consequential individual differences in the extent to which individuals consider future consequences of behavior is related to individual decisions in tempting situations.

Michael Seebauer and Jens Großer:

Do Elections Aggregate Costly Private Information When Abstention is Possible? – An Experimental Study

The Condorcet Jury Theorem (CJT) states that in a binary choice situation with common values groups perform better in choosing the collectively preferred alternative than any single individual would. The CJT, however, assumes that each individual is initially endowed with a piece of information about which alternative is best. In this paper we alter the classical CJT model by (i) introducing costly private information about the true state of the world that can be acquired before casting a vote and (ii) the possibility of abstention. In a second step we design and conduct a laboratory experiment to test the models predictions by comparing individual information acquisition behaviour under voluntary and compulsory voting as well as with different group sizes. In contrast to the theoretical predictions we observe more information acquisition under compulsory voting than under voluntary voting even when the group size is increased. Compulsory voting seems to have a beneficial effect on the information aggregation property of majority rule in reducing free-riding on informed individuals. Without being able to abstain the individuals feel more responsible for the group and invest more in information acquisition. Theoretically, in our model, the CJT no longer holds, i.e. groups do not perform better in decision making than any single individual would. The experimental results show that although the group performs worse than any single individual, they still do much better than theory predicts. Furthermore

the beneficial effect of compulsory voting on information acquisition also is reflected in a better group performance compared to voluntary voting.

Reinhard Tietz:

Wege experimenteller Forschung zwischen Rationalität und Komplexität

Die Wirtschaftswissenschaften stehen im Spannungsfeld zwischen Komplexität und Rationalität. Es werden die Wege insbesondere der experimentellen Forschung in diesem Spannungsfeld skizziert. Ursachen oder zumindest Anreize für diese Bewegungen werden aufgezeigt. Dabei werden die wichtigsten Merkmale beider Charakteristika von historischer und experimenteller Realität auf der einen Seite und der sie jeweils erklärenden Theorie auf der anderen Seite diskutiert. Zur besseren Anschauung werden einige Arbeiten vorzugsweise aus der Anfangszeit der experimentellen Wirtschaftsforschung in diesem Spannungsfeld verortet.

Welche Forschungswege erscheinen in diesem Zusammenhang besonders erfolgversprechend, um das menschliche Verhalten in ökonomischen Entscheidungssituationen besser erklären zu können? Da die Sozialwissenschaften generell auch ihr eigenes Forschungsobjekt verändern können, muß man unter ökonomischen und moralischen Aspekten auch fragen, welche Auswirkungen unterschiedliche Forschungsansätze auf dem Weg über Lehre und Beratung auf individuelles und staatliches Handeln haben können.

Ralf Radermacher and Nadja Trhal:

An experimental investigation of procedural fairness in the solidarity game

In this paper we examine the impact of procedural fairness on the actions of subjects. We deal with the question if people are willing to donate the same transfer payment whether or not inequality in payoffs is self-inflicted. In our solidarity experiment we compare two treatments: in one treatment all three subjects face the same probability of becoming a needy person, in the other treatment they have the choice to decide between a secure payment and a lottery including a certain probability of becoming a needy person. Then we ask all subjects how much they will give to losers in their group in case they are a winner. We found evidence for allocative as well as for procedural fairness concerns.

Thomas Gehrig, Werner Güth, René Levínsky, and Tobias Uske:

Willingness to pay for (un)conditional veto power

The games only differ in that the responder does (not) learn the suggested reward distribution in the Ultimatum (Yes/No) game. Although an opportunistic responder would always accept and therefore should not be willing to pay for knowing the proposal, earlier results (Güth, Levati, Ockenfels and Weiland, 2006) show that offers are less generous and responders, on average, earn less in the Yes/No game. By experimentally eliciting the willingness to pay for learning the proposal we investigate whether these effects are adequately anticipated or overestimated as observed in an earlier study (Gehrig, Güth, Levinsky, 2004). First results People are clearly not ambivalent between UG and YNG and offered/demanded significantly more than 0 for either changing or staying in the position of YNG/UG ($p < 0,001$ in both cases). There are 62 out of 120 students wanting to pay on average 0.35 Euro (0.162) for learning the proposal, which is significantly different from the ambivalence offer of 0 ($p < 0,001$) but insignificantly more than 0 ($p = 0.3423$). Out of 120 responders 100 asked for a compensation of on average 2.48 Euro (0.164), if forced out of the UG position. In contrast to YNG, the revealed willingness to pay for changing UG into YNG is significantly smaller than 0 ($p = 0.08463$). Thus students were aware of the advantage of the UG and only willing to accept a change if compensated sufficiently. Comparing the mean willingness to pay for learning the proposal with the benchmark difference, students ask for a higher compensation than justified by the true disadvantage, if randomly assigned to UG and forced to change the game into YNG. While they are willing to pay for learning the proposal, the value underestimates the true advantage of the UG in comparison to the YNG.

Luis Miller and Christoph Vanberg:

The influence of a sharing norm on behavior in a dictator game

Bodo Vogt:

Der Einfluss numerischer Wahrnehmung auf Fairnessentscheidungen: eine experimentelle Analyse von einfachen 2-Personenkonflikten

Goerg, S., Hennig-Schmidt, H., Walkowitz, G., Güth, W., and Weiland, T.:
Interregional and international diversity of fairness concerns - An online ultimatum experiment

We use as our workhorse the three person-ultimatum game with a dummy in addition to the usual proposer and responder (Güth and Van Damme (1998)) by letting the proposer know whether the pie is small or large. Based on this interaction scenario we want to explore how allocation proposals and responder behavior vary when participants are interacting with two other participants • in the same German (Jena) town, • in two other of three German (Berlin, Bonn, Jena) towns • in two other of three countries (Germany, Israel, Palestine). Will hiding behind the small pie (proposers with large pies offer fair shares of the small one) depend on where the two other participants come from? Will proposers and responders react to residence constellations by favoring partners from the same town or country? Will they, if they discriminate at all, only discriminate others (from another town or country)?

Ben Greiner, Axel Ockenfels, Peter Werner:
The Role of Inequality in a Dynamic Trust Game

We study the effects of economic heterogeneity in a dynamic version of the Trust Game by Berg, Dickhaut and McCabe. Initial endowments are varied to test if relative income positions influence behaviour in transactions involving trust and trustworthiness. Payoffs of the participants are accumulated to allow for adjustments of the income distribution. We find that investment rates decrease over time in a treatment starting with equal endowments while remaining stable in a treatment with initial inequality. This observation highlights the importance of fairness within the accumulation process for economic decisions. If high income levels of transaction partners are interpreted as signals for exploitative behaviour in previous rounds, the willingness to put trust in a transaction decreases.

Jan Wieneke:
Bewertung von Zeit

Irenaeus Wolff:
Observability in a dynamic common-pool resource problem

Parting from a simple 2-person 2-period common-pool resource game, the effects of different levels of observability (and timing) are investigated experimentally. Subjects play in either a simultaneous treatment or in one of three sequential treatments that convey perfect, noisy, and no information to the second-mover. We observe substantial deviation from the game-theoretic equilibrium throughout all treatments. Timing alone significantly influences play, albeit not as much as predicted by the "virtual observability" concept (Camerer et al.(1996)). Noisy signals lead to higher depletion rates and greater deviations from equilibrium play, especially on the first-movers' part. In all but the perfect information treatment, efficiency increases over the 10 rounds of play.

Eric Danan and Anthony Ziegelmeyer:
Are Preferences Complete? An Experimental Measurement of Indecisiveness under Risk

Completeness, the most commonly assumed axiom in preference theory, has not received much attention from the experimental literature. Indeed, incomplete preferences model a cognitive phenomenon (an agent's inability to compare alternatives), and therefore cannot be directly revealed through choice behavior. We build an experimental protocol involving choices among menus of lotteries, and reveal cognitive preferences' incompleteness by means of the concept of preference for flexibility. Our experimental protocol is designed to assess the descriptive validity of the completeness axiom, as well as to relate its possible violations to lotteries' riskiness. Two-thirds of the subjects whose choices reveal preferences in accordance with the underlying theory exhibit a strictly positive measure of incompleteness. The observed average measure of incompleteness equals approximately 17 percent and it is significantly greater than 10 percent. We do not find a significant relationship between a lottery's riskiness and its cognitive comparability with certain payoffs.